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~N.THE.SUPREME.C<?URT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------

KELLY GRAFF and KERI
GRAFF, his wife,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

No. 18062

BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff's-Appellants KELLY & KERI GRAFF (hereinafter "The
GRAFFS") take this appeal from a Declaratory Judgment Action
filed first before the Third Judicial District Court, and later
transferred to the Fourth Judicial District Court, seeking to
invalidate a mechanics lien filed against the GRAFFS property
by defendant- respondent BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION (hereinafter
"BOISE").
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted
Summary Judgment.

to the court on cross motions for

Following extensive briefing, the court

granted BOISE'S Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied the
GRAFFS Motion.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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As far back as 1909, the Utah Supreme Court, in Park City
M~at"C6~ ~~-·c6m~t6ck Sil~e~-Miriiri~ Co~;

103 P.254, refused to

invalidate a mechanic's lien for merely "technical" deficiencies.
In that case, the court discussed the proper judicial construction of the mechanic's lien statute, and stated that:
"The more modern decisions • • • are to
the effect that mechanic's lien
statutes should receive a fair and
reasonable, if not a liberal, construction,
with a view to preserving their
spirit and effectuating their purposes.
(citations omitted) It may be further
said that the more modern decisions
are practically harmonious in holding
that where there has been a substantial
compliance with the statute created
in the lien, and the lien has in fact
been established, the lien so established will not be defeated by mere
technicalities not by nice distinctions.
(citing) Lumber" Co. v. Martin, 31
Utah 249, 87 P.2d 714; 20 A. & E.
Encyclopedia (2d Ed.) 276.
In the more recent case of

Cha~e·~~

Dawsori, 215 P.2d 390 (Utah

1950), the Utah Supreme Court construed the mechanic's lien statutory notice requirements and stated that "substantial
compliance with the statute is all that is

requir~d."

These cases are in accord with the general rule as stated in
53 Am. Jur. 2d "Mechanic's Liens", 227:
" • • • recognition has been given to the
principle that where the purpose of the
requirement that a particular statement
be included in the claim of lien has been
achieved and no one is prejudiced, technical
requirements should not stand in the way
of achieving the purpose of the mecahnic's
3
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lien law. Thus, even though a claim
contains some defect or error it may
be upheld where the owner is apprised
of the claim and not misled thereby or
prejudiced in any manner. Immaterial
errors or defects do nto avoid the lien."
(Citations omitted).
The Graffs argue before this court, as they did below, that
the foregoing "substantial compliance" standard has been abandoned in Utah and in other jurisdictions, in favor of a "strict
compliance" standard which invalidates Notices of Mechanic's
Liens on the basis of small,f technical inconsistencies.

In sup-

port of this contention, the Graffs cite numerous cases where
defects appearing on the face of Notices of Mechanic's lien, supposedly analogous to those asserted in the instant case, have
been held to invalidate the respective lien holders' lien
interest.
In fact, the principles of law relied upon by Plaintiffs in
their attempt to invalidate Boise's lien have co-existed with
doctrine of substantial compliance ever since the mechanic's and
materialman's lien was first recognized as a statutory remedy to
the contractor and supplier, and in no way abrogate or modify the
"substantial compliance" standard.

The two principals may be

stated as follows:
1.

A mechanic's lien is a creature of statute, in deroga-

tion of the common law rights of the property owner, and must

4
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therefore be in complete compliance with all statutory prerequesites to its validity (see Utah Savings.and
v~·Mecham,

Loari·A~s6ci~tion

12 Utah 2d. 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961); Eccles :Lumber

Coinpany·v. ·Martin·, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906)).
2.

Where, however, a notice of mechanic's lien is in

compliance with the substance and purpose of the statute giving
rise thereto, technical deficiencies and nice distinctions, which
do not inure to the detriment of any parties, will not be permitted to defeat the validity of the lien filing (see Chase
Dawson, 215 P.2d 390 (1950);
Silver.Mining Company,

Park

City Meat.Company

103 P. 254 (1909)).

Arizona Court of Appeals in

Lewis·v~

v~

v~·

Comstock

As stated by the

Midway Lumber,

Inc~,

114

Arizona 750, 561 P.2d 750 (Ct. App. Ariz. Div. 2, 1977),
"The provisions of ARS 33-993 must be strictly
followed. (citations omitted) However, the
Arizona liens statutes are remedial and to be
liberally construed. (citations omitted) This
means that the steps required by ARS 33-993
.
to impose the lien must be followed, but in deter-1
mining what these steps are, the Court will give
the words a meaning which is reasonable, consistent with all the language used, and conducive
to the purpose accomplished by the enactment
of the statute. Thus, substantial compliance
not inconsistent with the legislative purpose is sufficient."
The Arizona Court is in accord with the general principles pf
mechanic's lien law expressed in 53 Am. Jur. 2d., Mechanic's
Liens, 210:

"The statutory requirements, whatever they may be,

5
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must be substantially, or, as stated in some cases, strictly,
compiled with, in order to perfect the lien.

A claim which does

not comply with such requirements is defective and invalid.

On.

the other hand, the lien claim is not itself a pleading, and
substantial compliance in good faith is sufficient to meet such
requirements, and some statutes expressly declare that substantial compliance shall be deemed sufficient."
In

light of the foregoing, the issue with which this court·

is faced is that of whether or not Boise's Notice and Claim of
Mechanic's lien in the instant case -(attached as Exhibit "A" to
the Graffs' Appellate Brief) substantially complies with Utah's
Mechanic's Lien Law, notwithstanding the alleged infirmaties
asserted by the Graffs.
POINT II
BOISE'S NOTICE AND CLAIM OF MECHANIC'S
LIEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE
VERIFICATION AND OATH REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH LAW.
As show on the face of the Notice and Claim of Mechanic's
lien relied upon by Boise (see Exhibit A to the Graffs Appellate
Brief), 'Boise's agent, Berk Buttars, signed his name to the
notice above a printed oath form which admittedly complies with
Utah law, and had his signature duly notarized.

The Graffs argue

that this was insufficient, in that Mr. Buttars did not sign his
name again following the printed oath.

6
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In a case which was factually identical to the instant case,
and where a signature was omitted following the form of oath but
was signed on the line above, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
the verification requirement was satisfied.

See, Stephenson v. ·

Ketchican· Spruce Mills, !nc., 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

In

that case, the court stated:
"Substantial compliance with the verification requirement is sufficient.
There is a substantial compliance here.
The form of oath followed by the words
'subscribed and sworn, to before me • • • ',
and the notary public's signature,
amounts in substance to a certificate
by the notary that the claim of lien
was verified by the oath of Anderson.
The claim of lien is not ineffective
by reason of any insufficienty in the
requirement for verification." Id~
at 499.
To the same effect are the cases of Lyons·v. Howard, 16 N.M.
327, 117 P.842 (1911) and

Ai~~li~ ~~

Kohn

16 Or. 363, 19

P~97,

103 (1888).
In support of their contention that the "substantial
compliance" standard has been abandoned with respect to verification and oath requirements of mechanic's lien law, the Graff's
cite the decisions of
of.Alaska~

Securiti

H.A.M~S~

C6~~ariy-~.

Electrical·Contractors

563 P.2d 258 (Supreme Court Alaska, 1977), and First

Mort~a~e-Co~pariy-~.·Hariseri

631 P.2d 919 (1981) for the

proposition that, in Alaska as in Utah, the principles announced
in the

Ketchi~ari S~ruce

Mills case have been overruled in favor
7
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of a strict compliance standard.

Such an assertion is clearly

misplaced.
In the case of

First

Security.Mortgage Company

v~·Hansen,

cited supra, which dealt with facts substantially similar to
those underlying the

H.A~M~s.·company

decision in Alaska, Justice

Howe affirmed a trial court decision invalidating a notice of
mechanic's lien containing a corporate acknowledgment, but no
verification of the contents of the lien.

The acknowledgement

there in question read as follows:
"on the 9th day of November, 1977, personally
appeared before me Roy B. Moore, who being
duly sworn, did say that he is the attorney
for Integral Steel Structures, and that said
instrument was signed in behalf of said
corporation by authority of a resolution of its
board of directors, and said Roy B. Moore
acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same."
Justice Howe aptly observed that "t:he acknowledgement in this
case did not contain even a general verification of the subject
matter of the notice of claim.

The only fact that was sworn to

was the identity and authority of the person signing the claim.
There is no suggestion that he personally vouched for the
accuracy of the facts underlying the claim."
quoted from the decision of
tractor~

of

Alask~;·tric.,

H~A~f.i~s~·company

~upra,

cited

Justice Howe then

v•. Electrical'Con~

observing that

"It is establised in law that a verification
is sworn statement of the truth of the facts
stated in the instrument which it verifies.
8
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A verification differs from an acknowledgement
in that the latter is a method of authenticating an instrument by showing that it was
the act of the person executing it."
This Court was entirely correct in refusing to validate a
Notice of Mechanic's Lien which nowhere contains even the implication of a verification.

Case law is very clear that such an

omission is material, and does not substantially comply with the
requirements of law.

In the instant case, however, the language

of verification appearing on the face of the notice of lien is
clear and unmistakable, and the lien claimant's oath in connection therewith is duly notarized.

The only relevant question is

whether or not the lien claimant's signature appears in the
proper location.

As such, the Harisen decision, like

decision, is inapplicable on its facts.

H~A.M.S.

It should, however, be

pointed out that the Hansen decision, even in its dicta, nowhere
makes mention of an abandonment of the substantial compliance
standard in effect in Utah for 75 years.

!/

!I It should also be noted that, in 1980, the Supreme Court of
Alaska reaffirmed the substantial compliance test in the decision
of'Anch6ra·e·$arid.and Gravel.Coin.an· Inc~ v~ ·wooldrid e, 619 P.2d
1014 Sup. Ct. A aska 980 • In that case, a Notice o
Mechanic's Lien contained a printed notary's jurat, certifying
that a corporate officer had appeared before the notary, anp had
sworn that the contents of the notice of lien were true and
(continued on next page)
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I

Other Western jurisdications have simil1arly adopted the
substantial compliance test regarding verif'ications of claims of
mechanic's lien.
lnc~ v~

In the decision of Gar~etjt.Building.Ciritifi;

Hale, 95 N.M. 450, 623 P.2d 570 (1981), the New Mexico

Supreme Court specifically adopted the subs'tantial compliance
test, ruling that technical deficiencies the verification of
the two

mechanic~s

liens there in question were not sufficiently

grave to invalidate the liens, where none of the parties in
interest had been prejudiced thereby.

The Graffs' attempt to

rely on the decision of 1.ewis. v~. MidwaY Lumber, cited supra, for
the proposition that the State of Arizona has abandoned the
substantial compliance standard is clearly misplaced.

That

deci~

sion, where relevant to this case, dealt with the total omission,
by two mechanic.' s lien claimants, of the name of the owner from
the lien notice.
th~

The Arizona Supreme Court specifically endorsed

doctrine of substantial compliance.

later reaffirmed in the case of

The same standard was

Westirighotise-Electri~"Sup~l~

(footnote continued)
correct. The officer did not sign following the certification:
only the·., notary affixed his signature thereafter. The court,
· observin·g that "no particular form of oath or affirmation is
required by Alaska law", ruled that, as the documents clearly
evidenced that the officer had appeared before the notary and had
sworn to the truth of the contents of the lien, the statutory
requirements had been satisfied.

10
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Company·v~

·\.lestern.Seed Production Corp., 119 Ariz. 377, 580 P.2d

1231 Ct. App.

Ariz., Div. 1, 1978).

The only decision quoted by the Graffs, in fact, which does
not fully comport with a substantial compliance standard
regarding verification is that of Saunders. Cash-Way. Lumber. and ..
Hardware Company v. Herrick, Mont. 587 P.2d 947 (Sup. Ct.
Montana, 1978).

In that case, it was held that a verification in

which a lien claimant swore to the content of the lien as true
"to the best of his knowledge, information and belief" invalidated the mechanic's lien in that the verification oath did not
reflect sufficient certainty.

The decision must be regarded as

an anomaly, and has since been ignored in other

jurisdicti~ns

on

similar facts (see, e.g. Marsh v •. Coleman, 93 N.M. 325, 600 P.2d
271 (Sup. Ct. N.M., 1979)).

Such a technically demajding stan-

dard is clearly at variance with the underlying policy of
mechanic's lien law, and would inflict needless injury on the
valid rights of countless lien claimants.
In the instant case, Boise's agent, Berk Buttars, signed the
notice of lien in question, and his oath regarding the accuracy
and truth of the notice was duly notarized.

No one has be~n

misled, prejudiced or injured by Mr. Buttars' failure to affix
two signatures to the document instead of one (see Point IV
infra).

It is therefore submitted that, as the trial court

11
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observed, Boise's Notice and Claim of Mechanic's Lien was in
substantial compliance with the verificationa nd oath requirements of Utah law, and created a valid mechanic's lien on the
Graffs' property.
POINT III
BOISE'S ERRONEOUS OMMISSION OF THE PRINCIPAL
CONTRACTOR'S NAME ON THE FACE OF ITS NOTICE OF MECHANIC'S
LIEN DID NOT INVALIDATE BOISE'S LIEN INTEREST UNDER UTAH LAW.
The Graffs' second contention regarding the validity of the
lien notice filed by Boise in the instant action deals with the
fact that it allegedly fails to state the name of the individual
to whom Defendant furnished materials.

As can be seen from the

fact of the document, Boise inadvertently entered its own name,
rather than that of Roncor, in the space provided for the name of
the recipient of the materials.

Roncor

was

listed, however, as

the owner of the lands, buildings, and improvements to be charged
with the lien.

Moreover, no allegation is made that the omission

complained of inured to the prejudice of any party in any way.
To the contrary, the Graffs' conduct in the instant action
clearly evidences that they had

ac~ual

reocrd notice of the iden-

tity of the lienor under Boise's Notice of Lien.

The rule in

such cases was stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in

Ltice

~rid'G6odfell6~,

Peccole

212 P.2d 718, 723-24 (1949):

"Courts will not give the statute such a
narrow or technical construction as to
12
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v.

fritter away, impede or destroy the right
of the lien claimant. As a general rule
a mistake in the statement as to the name
of the person with whom plaintiff contracted
or by whom he was employed will not defeat
the lien, where there was no intention to
deceive and no one has been misled to his
detriment." (emphasis added)
It has also been held by several courts that, where the person by whom the lienor was employed or to whom he furnished
materials can be reasonably inferred or ascertained upon an examination of the entire lien, notice is sufficient and the lien is
valid.

See~.,

Pec6lle·v. tuce and Goodfellow, supra at 725;

53 Am. Jur. 2d "Mechanic Liens" 228 at p. 749, and cases cited
therein; First.National Bank in Fort Collins
Son,-Inc.~

Knudson,

v~

Sam

McClure

and

C616., 431 P.2d 460 Sup. Ct. Colo. 1967); Boyce v.

219 Kan. 357, 548 P.2d 712 (Sup. ct. Kan., 1976); State

Ex •. Rel.Nilsen v. ·aoff, or. App., 474 P.2d 11 (Ct. App.

Or., 1970). -2/

Once again the prevailing standard is that of

substantial compliance.

~/ Before the court below, the Graffs represented that the
Pecolle decision had been.overruled bythe Nevada Supreme.Court
in the decision of Fischei:.- lfr6thers "-\7•. Harrah. Realt .. Com. an ,
Nevada 545 P.2d 203 Sup. Ct. Nev. 1976 • In that per curiam
decision, the notice of mechanic's lien in question was invalidated in that the claimant made no attempt of any kind to serve
notice of the lien upon the property owner, as required by N.R.S.
108.227. It is clear that a lien claimant who completely ignores
such a statutory requirement has not substantially complied with
the applicable mechanic's lien law. Neither the Fisher Brothers
decision, however, nor any other case of record overrules the
(continued on next page)
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POINT IV
CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY AND EQUITY DEMAND
ENFORCEMENT OF BOISE'S LIEN
The Utah Supreme Court, in the decision of Frehner v •. Mortori,
18 Utah 2d. 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967), observed that the purpose
of the Utah Mecahnic's Lien Statute is "to protect those who have
added directly to the valtte of real property by performing labor
or furnishing material upon it.

(Citation omitted)

The statute

is intended and designed to prevent the owner of land from taking
the benefits of improvements placed on his property without
·paying for the labor and materials that went into them."
There is no question in this case of unfair injury, or even
of surprise.

The Graffs, by accepting title to the property in

qeustion, impliedly undertook to satisfy all encumbrances of
record thereon.

They now seek to escape that responsibility by

setting.before the Court two inconsequential shorcomings appearing
on the face of Boise's Notice of

M~chanic's

Lien.

To invalidate

Boise's interest in the subject property on such grounds would
fly directly in the face of the purpose and policy of mechanic's
lien law.

It would, moreover, leave Boise without recourse;

t~e

(footnote continued)
Peccole opinion, which was, in fact, cited by the Arizona Supreme
Court as controlling authority for the continued vitality of the
substantial. compliance doctrine. in the case of WestinShouse
Electric Supply Company: v~. Western Seed . Production Corp., cited
supra.
14
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general contractor, Rancor, Inc., is now inoperable and judgmentproof.

It is precisely this situation that mechanic's lien law

was devised to remedy.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that the trial
courts order granting Boise's Motion for Summary Judgment should
be affirmed by this court.
DATED this~a~'--day of March, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

ROBERT D MAACK

Zc:-

Attorneys for Defendant
Boise Cascade Corporation
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